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Tamper-Proof Operating System
Raul Sanchez-Reillo
GUTI (University Group for Identif cation Technologies), Carlos III University of Madrid, Leganes, Madrid, Spain
Q1
Q2
Synonyms
Malicious-code-free operating system; Secure biometric token operating system
Definitio
Operating system with a robust design, as not to allow the execution of malicious code. Access to
internal data and procedures are never allowed without the proper authorization. In its more strict
implementations, this operating system will have attack detection mechanisms. If the attack is of a
certain level, the operating system may even delete all its code and/or data.
Introduction
The handling of sensible data in Information Systems is currently very usual. Which data is to be
considered sensible is up to the application, but at least we can consider those such as personal
data, f nancial data, as well as access control data. Actors dealing with such Information System
(clients/citizens, service providers, integrators, etc.) have to be aware of the security level achieved
within the system.
Although this is a very important issue in any system, when biometric information is handled, it
becomes a critical point. Reason for this is that biometric information is permanently valid, as it is
expected to be kept the same during the whole life of a person. While a private key can be changed
as desired and even cancelled, a user cannot change his f ngerprint (unless changing f nger) or
even cancel it. If cancelling biometric raw data, the user will be limited, in case of f ngerprints, to
10 successful attacks during his/her whole life. These kinds of considerations have already been
published even back to 1998, as it can be read in [1].
Therefore, biometric systems have to be kept as secure as possible. There are several potential
vulnerable points (PVPs) in any biometric system, as it can be seen in Fig. 1. All those 9 PVPs
have to be considered when designing a biometric solution. A good introduction to threats in a
biometric system can be found in [2, 3] and in BEM [4]:
• PVP 1 has to deal with user attitudes, as well as capture device front end. Regarding user
attitude, an authorized user can provide his own biometric sample to an impostor unknowingly,
unwillingly, or even willingly. From the capture device front-end point of view, such device may
not be able to:
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Fig. 1 Potential vulnerable points in a biometric system where enrolment is considered secured
– Detect a nonlive sample
– Detect the quality of the input sample, being able to discard those under a determined
threshold
– Protect the quality threshold against manipulation
– Detect degradation of its own degradation
– Resist environmental factors
– Eliminate residual information from previous captures
– Detect and discard sample injection
– Deny successive and fast sample presentation
• PVP 2 is directly related to the threat group 3 of BEM. It is basically focused on the capture
device back end as well as the front end of the Biometric Algorithm. Captured sample could be
intercepted and/or reinjected, to provide a replay attack. Major problem relies on the potential
loss of the user’s biometric identity. Also, another threat is a hill-climbing attack by injecting
successive biometric samples.
• PVPs 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 could be treated as in any other IT system (Trojans, viruses,
communications interception, data injection, hill-climbing attacks, etc.). So the same kind of
study shall be done. It is in this kind of PVPs where a tamper-proof operating system can be
of help. It is important to note that sensibility related to biometric-related information covers
not only the sample data, feature vectors, and templates but also thresholds, access logs, and
algorithms.
• PVP 5, being also a typical point of study in any IT system, has here more importance depending
on the information that could be given by the system after the matching. If matching result
is not given just by an OK/ERROR message, but also carries information about the level of
matching acquired, this could be used by an attacker to build an artif cial sample, by hill-
climbing techniques. For this PVP also, the tamper-proof O.S. can play an important role.
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Fig. 2 Some architectures of biometric authentication systems, splitting tasks in several devices
Biometric Devices
Regarding biometrics, a tamper-proof operating system is intended to be running in some (or any)
elements which are part of the biometric system. The idea of this kind of operating systems is not
new, as they are already implemented in other areas, such as smart cards for f nancial services. This
kind of electronic devices are designed under a basic security rule: “Not only the device has to work
under its constrained conditions of user, but also has to stop working outside those conditions.” In
few words, this means that, for example, if the smart card is expected to work with a supply voltage
from 4.5 to 5.5 volts, it does not have to work outside the range (e.g., if supply voltage is 4.4 or 5.6,
not even a response has to be obtained from the card). Related to the operating system inside the
card, this covers things like not allowing the execution of any undef ned/undocumented command
or not being able to install new functions that can behave as Trojan horses or viruses.
With this example, the reader can think that this kind of products does not really exist, because
several papers have been published related to security problems with smart cards (e.g., [5] and
some general audience press). It has to be stated that not all times an integrated circuit identif cation
card is referred; it is really a smart card (i.e., a microprocessor-based identif cation card with
a tamper-proof O.S.). Also, some real smart cards have not been properly issued, leaving some
critical data f les unprotected, or not using the security mechanisms provided. Rules to be followed
to properly use a smart card can be found in [6].
This same kind of rules can be applied to all kinds of biometric devices. Obviously, depending
on the system architecture, biometric devices can be of very different kinds. Figure 2 shows
two possible architectures of a biometric authentication system, which are usually known as (a)
match-off-card (also known as match-off-token) and (b) match-on-card (or match-on-token). Apart
from these two, many other schemes can be designed. The term “match” should be changed for
“comparison.” So instead of “match-off-card,” “off-card biometric comparison” should be used.
But within text “match-off-card” and “match-on-card” are used due to being terms widely used
among the industry.
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In a match-off-card system (e.g., [7]), we can consider a simplif cation of the system as
composed of three devices: the capture device, the token or card where the user’s template is
stored, and the rest of the system, which will be named as “biometric system.” Major difference
with the match-on-card system (e.g., [8]) is that here the token only stores the user’s template,
while in the match-on-card version, it also performs some biometric-related computations.
In any case, any of those devices should be designed following the rules given below regarding
a tamper-proof O.S. Being this viable, if those devices are developed as embedded systems, major
problems can arise when one of those devices (typically the biometric system) is running on a
general-purpose computer, where little or no control is available for installed applications and data
exchange.
Requirements for a Tamper-Proof O.S.
Q3
Once focused on the environment where a tamper-proof O.S. has to be found in biometric devices,
it is time to start its design. A good starting point will be following all previous works dealing with
smart cards. The reason for that is to transfer the know-how of near 30 years of secure identif cation
tokens given by the smart card industry [9]. This same ideas can be extrapolated to other biometric
devices, not only personal tokens.
First thing to consider when designing a tamper-proof O.S. is the different life phases that the
biometric device will have. All devices, specially those related to personal authentication, should
go through different life stages, from manufacturing to its use by the end users. As information
handled by them is really sensible, extra protection should be taken to avoid robbery, emulation, or
fraudulent access to the device or its information. Therefore, security mechanisms will be forced
in each life stage. Those mechanisms are mainly based on Transport Keys, which protect access to
using the device in each change of its life phase. Life phases define are:
• Manufacturing: where the device is assembled. The microcontroller within the device should
be protected by a Transport Key, before being delivered to the next stage. The way to compute
that Transport Key for each microcontroller will be sent to the company responsible of the next
phase by a separate and secured way.
• Personalization: In this phase, each device is differentiated from all others by storing some
unique data related to the fina application, user, and access conditions. Sometimes this phase is
split in several subphases, specially when the device has to be personalized for the application
(prepersonalization) and then for the f nal user (personalization), as it may happen with
identif cation tokens. In this phase, also data structure regarding the applications may be created,
as well as the full security architecture.
• Usage: The end user is ready to use the device.
• Discontinuation: Due to aging, limited time use, accidents, or attack detection, the device may
be out of use. This can be temporary (e.g., when keys are blocked) or permanent (no reactivation
is allowed). It has to be guaranteed that once discontinued, such device shall not be able to be
used.
Entering in details regarding the requirements for a tamper-proof operating system, we can state
the following general rules:
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• Mutual authentication mechanisms have to be used before exchanging any kind of biometric
information. In any communication, both parts have to be sure that the other party is a reliable
one.
• To avoid replay attacks, some time-stamping-like mechanisms have to be used (e.g., generation
of session keys to sign/cipher each message exchanged).
• Only the manufactured designed commands can be executed. No possibility of downloading
new commands has to be allowed. Therefore, f ash reprogramming and device updating are
strongly discouraged.
• Before executing anything in the biometric device, full integrity check (both cryptographic and
semantic) of the command and its data has to be performed. Some attacks would try to exploit
undef ned cases in the semantics of a command exchanged.
• All sensible data (sample data, feature vectors, templates, and thresholds) has to be transmitted
and ciphered.
• If there is a command related to changing parameters, it has to be sent with all security
mechanisms allowed, as the system can be even more vulnerable to attacks related to changing
those parameters (e.g., quality or verif cation thresholds).
• Feedback information from the device to the external world has to be as short as possible to
avoid hill-climbing attacks. For example, a device performing comparisons in an authentication
system has to provide only a YES/NO answer, but not giving information on the matching score
obtained.
• Attack detection mechanisms have to be considered. If an attack is detected, then the device
has to stop working, and a reinitialization has to be made. If the detected attack is considered
extremely serious, the device may consider deleting not only all temporal data but also its
permanent data or even its programming code.
• Successive failed attempts to satisfy any security condition has to be considered as an attack,
and therefore, the device has to be blocked, as it happens with a PIN code in a smart card.
• No direct access to hardware resources (e.g., memory addresses, communication ports, etc.) can
be allowed. Most virus and Trojan horses benef t for not following this rule.
• As soon as data is no longer needed by the operating system, it has to be erased as to prevent
latent data to be acquired in a successful attack.
Most of these requirements can be satisfie by defin ng a security architecture based on crypto-
graphic algorithms. Several implementations can be followed. If the developer is not familiar with
these mechanisms, it is suggested to follow the secret codes/secret keys architecture of a smart
card and the Secure Messaging mechanism [6,9]. These can be directly applied to personal tokens
and upgraded to another kind of biometric devices.
Example of an O.S. Instruction Set
When implementing a tamper-proof O.S., several design decisions have to be made: frame formats,
time-outs, number of retries, etc. All these issues depend on the communication strategy followed
by the whole biometric system. Therefore, no general rule can be given to the designed.
Regarding the instruction set, a minimal list of functions can be considered, depending on the
device where the O.S. is to be included. This is also dependent on the platform chosen. As an
example, the instruction set for a limited-resources platforms is given. This instruction set has been
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proposed to ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37 to be considered as a lighter version of BioAPI, the standardized
Application Program Interface for biometric applications. This lighter version is called BioAPI
Lite and is being standardized as ISO/IEC 29164.
Q4
Commands needed by a limited biometric device depend on the functionality of such device.
Obviously a capture device is not the same as a personal token. But in general terms these
commands can be classif ed in four major groups: module management, template management,
biometric enrolment, and biometric process.
Q5 Management commands relate to managing the overall module behavior. Four commands can
be considered in this group:
• Initialize: Tells the module to initialize itself, opening the offered services, and initialize all
security for ciphered data exchange. This command is to be called any time a session is started
(power on, session change, etc.). Without being called, the rest of the commands shall not work.
• Close: Tells the module to shut down.
• Get properties: Provides information on capabilities, conf guration, and state.
• Update parameters: Updates parameters in module. One of such parameters can be the
comparison threshold. For that reason, this function is recommended to be used with all security
mechanisms available.
Template management commands refer to those functions needed to store and retrieve templates
from the module. These functions will be supported by those modules that are able to store users’
templates. These set of commands are expected to be used by personal tokens or small databases.
The functions def ned are:
• Store template: stores the input template in the internal biometric module database
• Retrieve template: obtains the referenced template from the biometric module
The next group is the biometric enrolment commands. This group of functions will be considered
in systems where enrolment is to be made internally. Due to the different processes of enrolment,
even for a single biometric modality (e.g., different numbers of samples needed), in limited devices,
a multistep procedure is suggested. First, user will call related functions to obtain samples for the
enrolment, and then a call to the enrolled function will have to be done. Commands def ned are:
• Capture for Enrol: Performs a biometric capture (using on-board sensor), keeping the informa-
tion in module for later enrolment process. The number this function is called depends on the
number of samples the module needs to perform enrolment. As this operation involves user
interaction, biometric module manufacturer shall consider time-out values to cancel operation,
reporting that situation in the status code returned.
• Acquire for Enrol: Receives a biometric sample to keep the information in module for later
enrolment process. The number this function is called depends on the number of samples the
module needs to perform enrolment. Depending on module capabilities, input data can be a raw
sample, a preprocessed one, or its corresponding feature vector.
• Enrol: Performs an enrolment to create a template and stores the template in module. To execute
this function, either Capture for Enrol or Acquire for Enrol functions has to be called in advance.
Enrol with process with the samples temporally stored in the module. The return value is the
number of template internally assigned.
• Erase Enrolments: Erases all enrolment templates or the indicated (by number) template.
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Finally, the fourth group is dedicated to all those commands that are dealing with biometric
functions. It covers the capture process, feature extraction, and comparison. Even with comparison,
it handles comparisons with internal templates or templates coming from the external world:
• Capture: Performs a biometric capture (using on-board sensor), returning biometric sample.
• Process: Processes biometric sample to create comparable recognition data (feature vector).
Depending on module capabilities, the input sample can be a raw sample or a preprocessed one.
• Capture and process: Performs a biometric capture (using on-board sensor), returning its feature
vector.
• Compare external: Compares a feature vector with the template sent by the external world.
• Process and compare external: Processes a biometric sample and compares it with the template
sent by the external world.
• Capture and compare external: Performs a biometric capture (using on-board sensor), processes
the biometric sample, and compares it with the template sent by the external world.
• Compare internal: Compares a feature vector with templates stored in the module. If the
input parameter is 0xFF, comparison will be done with all templates stored. In another case,
comparison is done only with the template whose internal number is given at the input parameter.
• Process and compare internal: Processes a biometric sample and compares it with templates
stored in the module. If the input parameter is 0xFF, comparison will be done with all templates
stored. In another case, comparison is done only with the template whose internal number is
given at the input parameter.
• Capture and compare internal: Performs a biometric capture (using on-board sensor), processes
the biometric sample, and compares it with templates stored in the module. If the input
parameter is 0xFF, comparison will be done with all templates stored. In another case,
comparison is done only with the template whose internal number is given at the input parameter.
Some of these instructions involve user interaction. Therefore, manufacturer shall consider time-
out values to cancel operation if it is exceeded, reporting that situation within the protocol used.
Applicability of Tamper-Proof O.S.
As mentioned above, this kind of operating system is desirable to be included in all devices related
to biometric identif cation, but unfortunately this is not always possible. As in many applications,
a general-purpose computer is used, and general-purpose operating systems are used (such as
Windows, Linux, etc.). Developing those O.S. in a tamper-proof way without restricting usability
and generality is nearly impossible. Therefore, tamper-proof operating systems are meant for those
embedded systems, sensors, and personal tokens dealing with personal identif cation.
Using this kind of tamper-proof O.S. in these devices, restrict the number of security holes
to the minimum within the device and to be concentrated only in those general-purpose systems
used. As some tasks will be performed in such secured devices, security leaks will be avoided. For
example, if a biometric system uses personal tamper-proof tokens with match-on-card capability,
the user’s template will never be exposed, and possibility of hill-climbing or replay attacks will
be cancelled. Thus, all comparison and decision blocks will be secured, restricting the potential
security problems to the relevant previous modules.
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Summary
Due to the sensibility of biometric data, security in biometric devices has to be considered. One
of the ways to protect privacy is to include a tamper-proof operating system. This O.S. would not
allow direct access to hardware resources of the device, neither to temporary nor permanent data.
This O.S. has also to control the different life stages of the device. A set of requirements have been
def ned that have to be considered when developing such tamper-proof O.S. Finally an example
of the commands to be covered by some devices have been given. Including this kind of O.S. in
all biometric devices will improve the security of the whole system. Unfortunately, when some
parts of the biometric system has to be implemented in a general-purpose computer with an open
operating system, applying these rules is not easy.
Related Entries
 Biometric Security Threat
 Biometric Token
 Biometric Vulnerabilities
 Match-off-Card
 Match-on-Card
 Template Security
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